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Success in the prevention and treatment
of infectious diseases has saved more lives
than any other achievement of medical
science. The three greatest advances have
been clean water, immunization, and the
advent of antibiotics and, more recently,
antivirals. Despite this record of suc-
cess, we are far from conquering the
grand challenge to human health posed
by microbes. All that has been achieved is
the consequence of increasingly sophisti-
cated research. Through advances in tech-
nology that have led to deep sequencing,
we are now able to identify previously
unrecognized bacteria and other microbes,
which had previously eluded our appreci-
ation because of our inability to culture
them. One of the consequences has been an
increased understanding of the omnipres-
ence of bacterial populations in the human
body. It is now estimated that the human
body on average contains 10 times as many
bacterial cells as human cells (Savage, 1977;
Berg, 1996). In addition, the human body
probably contains at least 10 times as many
viral genomes as bacterial genomes (Lower
et al., 1996; Downey et al., 2014). Thus,
humans are very much a diverse biologi-
cal community and it behooves us to gain
as complete knowledge as possible if we are
to continue to enhance human health.
Because much of the research in this
area involves study of microbial pathogens,
there is potential risk of infection for
researchers in the laboratory. Additionally,
there is the risk that dangerous microbes
under study might escape from the labora-
tory and pose a risk to the public health (as
has been voiced in the case of highly path-
ogenic avian influenza H5N1). Although
many of the microbes under study are
normally present in the environment, in
special cases the bacteria or viruses have
natural or enhanced virulence not usually
present in the environment and these are
of especial concern. Pathogens have been
classified with respect to the degree of
risk they represent, both to lab workers
and to the public. The assessment depends
not only on the virulence of the microor-
ganism, but also on whether an effective
vaccine exists and/or effective antimicro-
bial/antiviral therapy is available. Where an
effective vaccine exists, laboratory work-
ers should be immunized and precautions
should be taken to physically contain the
microbes under study. Depending on the
assessed virulence, various levels of phys-
ical containment have been mandated. In
the United States, there are functionally
four levels. Level one assumes no measur-
able risk and level four is for the most
virulent pathogens for which no effective
immunization or antimicrobial therapy
exists. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) and the NIH pub-
lish a manual of recommendations for the
physical containment of pathogens entitled
“Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomed-
ical Laboratories” (Abraham et al., 2009).
These recommendations have been incor-
porated into regulations when the bacteria
and viruses under study have been desig-
nated as select agents [see National Select
Agent Registry (2014) for criteria used],
which possibly could be used for biological
warfare or bioterrorism.
Despite the efforts to promote biosafety,
biosecurity, and good practices, assur-
ing adherence to the prescribed practices
remains a serious challenge. Although acci-
dental laboratory acquired infections are
rare and despite the fact that there have
been no proven disease outbreaks attrib-
utable to release (“escape”) of pathogens
from a laboratory, laboratory accidents and
incidents do happen with a measurable fre-
quency (Henkel et al., 2012). [It should be
acknowledged that there is a strong sus-
picion that the 1977 H1N1 influenza out-
break was the consequence of a labora-
tory release (Webster et al., 1992).] There
have been reports of three serious inci-
dents in the U.S. in the past several weeks
(Frieden, 2014b). A high containment lab-
oratory at the CDC attempted to inactivate
Bacillus anthracis using a non-validated
method and then transferred the sample
to a lower containment facility for further
study. A week later, it was discovered that
the sample had not been completely inac-
tivated, which resulted in about 80 workers
being potentially exposed. These workers
were all offered immunization and antibi-
otic prophylaxis. Three laboratories had to
be shut down and decontaminated. Fortu-
nately, no one became ill. Secondly, a labo-
ratory at the CDC transferred a culture of a
non-virulent (for humans) strain of avian
influenza to a U.S. Department of Agri-
culture laboratory where it later was dis-
covered that the culture was contaminated
with highly virulent H5N1 avian influenza
virus. Finally, as a unit of the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) housed at the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) pre-
pared to move to a new campus, a carton
in a cold room was discovered to con-
tain six sealed vials of smallpox (Guillemin,
2014), a virus only permitted by treaty to
be present at the CDC and one site in Rus-
sia. Apparently, the vials had been in the
cold room for almost 50 years, because no
one had ever bothered to either clean out or
inventory the space. According to the CDC,
the smallpox, which had been lyophilized,
was still viable (Frieden, 2014a). Additional
vials containing yet different pathogens
were present in the same carton. These
three incidents are all too graphic exam-
ples of the consequences of inadequate
biosafety and biosecurity and point to the
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necessity for increased attention to these
challenges.
Use of microbes as a weapon has a long
history; examples include catapulting dead
bodies into besieged cities in ancient times
and giving blankets previously used for
smallpox patients to Native Americans dur-
ing the colonial period. State sponsored
research in biological warfare continued
through World War II until the biological
weapons convention was signed in 1972.
Despite having signed the convention, the
Former Soviet Union apparently contin-
ued development and production of offen-
sive biological weapons until 1990 (Weiner,
1998). One consequence of this activity
was the accidental aerosol release of B.
anthracis spores from a production facil-
ity in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk in 1979,
which resulted in multiple deaths (Mesel-
son et al., 1994). Post 1990, we do not
have irrefutable evidence of state sponsored
research for the development and/or pro-
duction of biological weapons, although
research into defensive measures contin-
ues. Today, we are most concerned by the
possible use of biological weapons by ter-
rorists. There have been multiple instances
of this on a small scale. In the United States,
the best known example of this was mailing
of letters containing B. anthracis spores to
public officials and members of the media.
Although only five people died as a result,
this terrorist act cost over 500 million dol-
lars for remediation of contaminated facil-
ities and led to the introduction of signifi-
cant legislation to regulate research involv-
ing select agents, i.e., those agents thought
likely to be used by terrorists (Biosecurity,
2012). As the anthrax incident graphically
demonstrated, a relatively small attack can
have an enormous public (and economic)
impact (Gursky et al., 2003).
With the advent of modern molecu-
lar genetics and rapid DNA sequencing,
and the development of genetic engineer-
ing, the ability to analyze the molecular
mechanisms underlying microbial patho-
genicity has been enormously enhanced as
has the ability to engineer desired proper-
ties into bacteria or viruses. Much of this
work can be done in relatively modest facil-
ities,which raises the concern that would be
bioterrorists have the potential to develop
their own bioweapons.
Especially after the anthrax incident of
2001, the concept of dual use research
received much more attention in the
United States (Biotechnology Research in
an Age of Terrorism, 2004). In fact, it is pos-
sible to perceive of both good and bad uses
of almost any research results. Experiments
of most concern are those with results
that might be directly misapplied. The US
National Science Advisory Board for Biose-
curity (NSABB) has defined seven types of
experiments that fall into this area, which
are designated dual use research of concern
or DURC (DURC). “These are research
that might (1) enhance the harmful conse-
quences of a biological agent or toxin, e.g.,
information on how to make a seasonal
strain of influenza as deadly as the 1918
pandemic virus; (2) disrupt immunity or
the effectiveness of an immunization with-
out clinical or agricultural justification,
e.g., insertion of an immunosuppressive
cytokine into a viral genome to render the
antiviral immune response less effective;
(3) confer to a biological agent resistance
to a clinically and/or agriculturally useful
prophylactic or therapeutic intervention
against that agent or facilitate their abil-
ity to evade detection methodologies, e.g.,
information on how to confer doxycycline
resistance to Vibrio vulnificus; (4) increase
the stability, transmissibility, or the ability
to disseminate a biological agent or toxin,
e.g., information on changing genetic fac-
tors to increase transmissibility; (5) alter
the host range or tropism of a biological
agent or toxin, e.g., knowledge of how to
convert non-zoonotic agents into zoonotic
agents; (6) enhance the susceptibility of a
host population, e.g., information on how
to create a stable recombinant Lactobacillus
caseii that could effectively block the host’s
ability to synthesize an important immune
signal, such as tumor necrosis factor alpha,
which may directly facilitate the evasion
of normal host defenses; and (7) gener-
ate a novel pathogenic agent or toxin or
reconstitute an eradicated or extinct bio-
logical agent, e.g., information on how to
construct a de novo microbial pathogen
using unique gene sequences that do not
exist in nature, or how to reconstitute a
pathogen that no longer exists in nature,
such as the 1918 pandemic influenza
virus.”
Consideration for ways to deal with
DURC are several. The first one is who
determines that a research project meets
the definition of DURC. The primary
consideration should be by the investiga-
tor and the local institution. Equivalent
responsibility should rest with the fund-
ing agency. However, experience has shown
that research is being done and reported
that meets the DURC definition. Often
the journal to which the manuscript is
submitted is the final filter. On several
occasions, the editor has prevailed upon
the authors to redact or modify certain
details of the research. In one well reported
case, two papers reporting gain of function
experiments with avian influenza H5N1
were brought to the NSABB for review
(Herfst et al., 2012; Imai et al., 2012). Ini-
tially, the NSABB recommended that cer-
tain details of both papers be redacted
and only be made available to individu-
als with a certifiable need to know (Berns
et al., 2012a,b). After modification of both
manuscripts and additional consideration
by NSABB, the modified manuscripts were
recommended for publication. A major
problem raised by the initial recommenda-
tion was the question of who could make
the decision about who should be able to
receive the full information. Because the
site of the research in one instance was in
the Netherlands and in another instance
the journal involved was international, an
authority able and willing to decide on
distribution did not exist. Under current
conditions, there is nothing to prevent an
author whose work is considered by one
journal to be DURC, from shopping the
manuscript around until he/or she finds
one that is willing to publish the manu-
script without modification. As a conse-
quence of the H5N1 experience, the US
government established a policy to make
the funding agency decide upfront about
the question of DURC [see DURC Deter-
mination (2014)]. However, this does not
resolve questions arising from the interna-
tional nature of science. Further consider-
ation of the issue at the international level
is urgently required.
Both biosafety and biosecurity raise
fundamental questions about the conduct
of science, which deserve the attention of
the scientific community.
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